UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-18-2017

Petrus Fam. Trust Dated May 1, 1991 v. Kirk
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44784

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Petrus Fam. Trust Dated May 1, 1991 v. Kirk Appellant's Brief Dckt. 44784" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6763.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6763

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PETRUS FAMILY TRUST DATED MAY
1, 1991 and EDMOND A. PETRUS, JR.,
individually and as Co-Trustee of the
SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.
0044784-2017
Petrus Family Trust dated May 1, 1991,
Plaintiffs / Appellants
v.

Valley County District Court Case No.
2014-71-C
.

I

CHRIS KIRK d/b/a KIRK
ENTERPRISES,

I

Defendant / Res ondent

APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Valley County
Honorable Judge Jason D. Scott, Presiding
Amy A. Lombardo, Esq. (ID Bar No. 8646)
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER
800 West Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 562- 4900
Attorneys for Appellants, Petrus Family
Trust and Edmond A. Petrus, Jr.

C. Tom Arkoosh, Esq.
Daniel A. Nevala, Esq.
ARKOOSH LAW OFFICES
802 W. Bannock Street, Suite 900
P.O. Box 2900
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Respondent, Chris Kirk
d/bla Kirk Enterprises .

John Morris, Esq. (Pro Hae Vice)
Rachel E. Moffitt, Esq. (Pro Hae Vice)
HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
401 West A Street, Suite 2600
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 236-1551
Attorneys for Appellants, Petrus Family
Trust and Edmond A. Petrus, Jr.

AUG 18 2017
Sliiiii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Authorities

2

I.

NATURE OFTHECASE

7

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

9

III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

10

A.

The Pleadings.

10

B.

Kirk's Motion for Summary Judgment.

11

C.

The District Court Order Granting
Summary Judgment.

12

Petrus' s Motion for Reconsideration.

13

D.

IV.

STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY

14

V.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

14

VI.

STANDARDOFREVIEW

14

VII.

DISCUSSION

15

A.

The History of Implied Warranties.

15

B.

Idaho Case Law Supports Petrus's Position.

18

1.

Tomita v. Johnson.

18

2.

Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft.

19

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(Cont.)

Page
3.

4.
5.

C.

D.

E.

VII.

Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin:
The Majority Opinion.

21

Tusch: The Additional Opinions
on Point.

25

Post-Tusch Case Law Confirms
Its Central Ruling.

27

Persuasive Authority from Other
Jurisdictions Supports Petrus.

30

The Economic Loss Rule Does
Not Support Summary Judgment.

33

Public Policy Supports Petrus' s
Right to Recover.

36

CONCLUSION

38

3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

American West Enterprises, Inc. v. CNH, LLC
155 Idaho 746,316 P.3d 662 (2013)
Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co.,
264 Ind. 277,342 N.E.2d 619 (1976)
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel
91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 (1966)

28,29

24

22,36,37

Bishop v. Owens,
152 Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012)

27

Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc.
141 Idaho 296, 108 P.3d 996 (2005)

34

Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elect, Inc.
150 Idaho 22,244 P.3d 166 (2010)

35

Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Donnelly
154 Idaho 499, 300 P.3d 31 (2013)

28,29

Gibson v. John D. Campbell and Co.
624 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App. 1981)

31

Humber v. Morton
426 S. W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)

31

Hummer v. Evans
129 Idaho 274,923 P.2d 981 (1996)

14

Just 's Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co.
99 Idaho 462,470 583 P.2d 997 (1978)

35

MacPherson v. Buick
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916)

16

4

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Cont.)

Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc.
600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979)

23

Ramerth v. Hart
133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999)

28,29

Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc.
139 Ariz. 242,678 P.2d 427 (1984)

24

Richman v. Watel
565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1978)

31 32

Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft Company
97 Idaho 348,544 P.2d 306 (1975)

passim

Swaw v. Ortell
137 Ill.App.3d 60, 484 N.E.2d 780 (1984)

32

State v. Mitchell Construction Co.
108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984)

26

Tomita v. Johnson
49 Idaho 643,200 P. 395 (1930)

18

Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin
113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987)

passim

Statutes
Idaho Code
Section 5-216
Section 5-217
Section 5-218
Section 5-219
Section 5-224
Section 5-241

10
7,20
10
10
11
passim

5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(Cont.)

Secondary Sources
Prosser, The Assault on the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960)
R. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw (2d ed. 1977)

6

15, 16, 20
23

Plaintiffs and Appellants, PETRUS FAMILY TRUST DATED MAY
1, 1991, and EDMOND A. PETRUS, JR., individually and as Co-Trustee of
the Petrus Family Trust dated May 1, 1991 (together, "Petrus"), submit this
Opening Brief on appeal from the summary judgment entered against them in
their construction defect lawsuit against Defendant and Respondent, CHRIS
KIRK d/b/a/ KIRK ENTERPRISES ("Kirk").

I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Kirk built a home under contract to Nancy Gentry-Boyd ("GentryBoyd"), completing construction in about August of 2005. Petrus bought that
home almost seven years later, in April of 2012. A year and a half after that,
in October of 2013, a contractor hired by Petrus to address a seemingly simple
problem with a set of French doors, discovered latent defects in the property
caused by poor construction.
Petrus sued Kirk, asserting a cause of action for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability. However, the district court (Judge Jason D. Scott
presiding) ruled that Petrus's claim was "a contract action, not a tort action,"
and was therefore governed by Idaho Code section 5-241(b) (accrual of
contract claims), and section 5-217 (the four-year statute of limitations on
contract actions). Applying that analysis, the district court deemed Petrus's
claim to be untimely, and granted summary judgment in favor of Kirk.
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In this appeal, Petrus presents an issue of first impression for this
Court, namely, whether a cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of
habitability sounds in contract or in tort. Petrus submits that the only logical
answer is that it sounds in tort. That conclusion, Petrus explains below, is
compelled by important public policies (like protecting homeowners from
catastrophic damages caused by large-scale builders) and by evolving case law
from this Court on the subject (particularly Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps
v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975) ("Salmon Rivers")

(holding that any claim that does not require privity of contract must sound in
tort), and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987)
("Tusch") (holding that a remote purchaser of a home can sue the builder for

breach of the implied warranty, even absent privity of contract)).
Thus understood as a tort, Petrus asserts that his claim against Kirk was
governed by Idaho Code section 5-241(a) (a six-year accrual statute of
limitations for tort actions relating to real estate investment), and section 5224 (a four-year statute of limitation where, like here, the plaintiff reasonably
does not discover the latent defect before expiration of the six-year period),
and should not have been dismissed.

Accordingly, the order granting

summary judgment should be reversed, and the case remanded to the district
court for further proceedings on the merits.
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The single legal issue presented by this case is framed by very few facts
(as summarized above). They were presented thoroughly and fairly in the
district court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary
judgment, are undisputed, and are reprised here, very simply, as follows.!
Kirk built the home at issue under an oral contract with Gentry-Boyd.
R. Vol. 1, p. 562. Construction began in June of 2004, and was completed in

August of 2005. R. Vol. 1, p. 562.
Almost seven years later, in April of 2012, Petrus purchased the home
from Gentry-Boyd. R. Vol. 1, p. 826. Petrus moved into the home in May or
June of 2012. R. Vol. 1, p. 826. Soon thereafter, Petrus discovered that the
French doors in the home were swollen with water, could not open or close
properly, and could not be locked. R. Vol. 1, pp. 285-86, L. 116: 1-119:4; 826.
A little more than a year after that, in October of 2013, a remediation
contractor hired by Petrus to address the doors discovered extensive dry rot
resulting from years of water intrusion facilitated by construction defects, and
causing tens of thousands of dollars of damages. R. Vol. 1, p. 777.

The district court's order regarding Kirk also resolved
issues concerning Gentry-Boyd (the builder), and Kevin Batchelor
(Petrus's real estate agent). Neither Gentry-Boyd nor Batchelor are
parties to this appeal, so this brief does not discuss any of the facts or law
relevant to them.
9

III.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history of this case as it relates to Kirk is also relatively
simple. As summarized below, it involved: (A) Petrus's complaint, (B) Kirk's
motion for summary judgment, (C) the district court's order granting summary
judgment; and (D) the district court's order denying reconsideration.

A.

The Pleadings.

Petrus filed his original complaint in March of 2014, asserting multiple
claims against Gentry-Boyd (not relevant here). R. Vol. 1, p. 15.
In September of 2014, Petrus filed a first amended complaint, adding
Kirk as a party, and asserting claims against him for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability and conspiracy to defraud.

R. Vol. 1, p. 28.

In

September of 2015, Petrus filed a second amended complaint-the operative
complaint for purposes of this appeal-again asserting two claims against
Kirk for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and conspiracy to
defraud. R. Vol. 1, p. 71.
Kirk filed a general-denial answer to that complaint, which included the
affirmative defense that Petrus' s claims were "barred by the applicable statute
of limitations under 5-216, 5-218, 5-219, and 5-241, and other governing laws
of the state ofldaho." R. Vol. 1, pp. 91, 96.
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B.

Kirk's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Discovery ensued and, in May of 2016, Kirk filed a motion for

summary judgment.

R. Vol. 1, pp. 532 (motion); 535 (supporting

memorandum); 561 (Kirk declaration); 112 (attorney declaration). In sum, as
it relates to this appeal, Kirk argued that the cause of action against him for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability was a contract claim, governed
by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 5-217,
and was therefore time barred. R. Vol. 1, pp. 551-53.
Petrus opposed Kirk's motion.

R. Vol. 1, pp. 571 (opposition

memorandum); 823 (Petrus declaration); 598 (attorney declaration); 769
(expert declaration, attesting to damage at Petrus's home); 775 (contractor
declaration, attesting to discovery of the damage at Petrus' s home). In sum,
Petrus argued that his claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability
sounded in tort, that his claim did not accrue until he discovered the defects
(in October of 2013), and, therefore, that his claim was timely under Idaho
Code section 5-241(a) (the six-year accrual statute for torts) and section 5-224
(adding four more years for latent defects). R. Vol. 1, pp. 584-89.
Kirk filed reply papers, reiterating his central argument that Petrus' s
claim sounded in contract and was governed-and barred-by the four-year
statute of limitations. R. Vol. 1, p. 907.
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C.

The District Court Order Granting Summary Judgment.

The district court heard oral argument on Kirk's motion on June 20,
2016. At that hearing, Petrus' s counsel conceded that judgment should be
entered in favor of Kirk on the conspiracy to commit fraud claim Tr. Vol. 1,
pp. 7-8, the parties made their respective (and conflicting) arguments
concerning the statutes of limitations applicable to Petrus' s implied warranty
claim (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 71-75 (Petrus); 105-08 (Kirk)), and the district court
ultimately took the matter "under advisement." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 112.
On July 7, 2016, the district court filed its Memorandum Decision and
Order, reciting the relevant facts (as related above), and turning first to what it
called Kirk's "frontline argument" regarding the statute of limitations. R. Vol.
1, pp. 967, 975. The district court fairly set forth the positions of both sidesturning fundamentally on whether the claim for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability sounded in tort or in contract-and opined that "Kirk
hasthebetterhalfoftheargument." R. Vol. 1,pp. 975-77.
Specifically, the district court concluded-based on "inferences" it
drew from Tusch, "the 1987 case in which the Idaho Supreme Court extended
to subsequent home purchasers the right to sue builders for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability"-that:

"Petrus's claim for breach of the

implied warranty of habitability is a contract action, not a tort action." R. Vol.
1, p. 977. On that basis, the district court ruled: "Hence, Petrus's claim is
subject to section 5-241(b)'s completion-of-construction accrual rule, and to
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section 5-217's four-year limitations period. Under those statutes, the claim is
time-barred. Kirk therefore is entitled to summary judgment .... " R. Vol. 1,
p. 979.
On November 15, 2016, judgment was entered in favor of Kirk
consistent with the order granting summary judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 1003.

D.

Petrus's Motion for Reconsideration.
On November 28, 2016, Petrus filed a motion for reconsideration,

explaining that the district court's order conflicted with Tusch, and arguing
that "the cause of action for breach of warranty cannot possibly accrue before
the latent defect manifests itself."

R. Vol. 1, pp. 1006 (motion); 1009

(supporting memorandum).
On December 5, 2016, the district court filed its Order Denying Motion
for Reconsideration.

R. Vol. 1, p. 1069.

Again, the district court fairly

framed the issue, but disagreed with Petrus, insisting that its approach to this
unsettled question was "in keeping with Tusch." R. Vol. 1, p. 1071.
Petrus then filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the judgment in favor
of Kirk (R. Vol. 1, p. 1092), and the "unsettled" legal issue framed in the
district court regarding the fundamental nature of the claim for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability is now squarely presented for de novo review
by this Court.
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IV.
STATEMENT OF APPEALABILITY

Petrus's appeal is from a final judgment of a district court in a civil
action and is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 ("Appealable
Judgments and Orders").

V.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Whether, in the context of a lawsuit brought by a remote

homebuyer against a home builder, a claim for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability arises in tort or in contract.
2.

Whether that claim for breach of the implied warranty of

habitability is governed by statutes of limitations governing torts or governing
contracts.

VI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In granting summary judgment in favor of Kirk based on its
interpretation of the proper statute of limitations to apply to Petrus' s claim, the
district court was ruling as a matter of law. Accordingly, the district court's
ruling should be reviewed de novo. Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274, 279,
923 P.2d 981, 986 (1996).
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VII.
DISCUSSION

Here, Petrus first provides background confirming that claims for
breach of the implied warranties were historically considered tort claims.
Next, Petrus traces the Idaho case law that leads to the inescapable conclusion
that breach of the implied warranty of habitability must logically be regarded
as a tort claim.
Third, Petrus examines persuasive authority from other jurisdictions
that expressly holds that such claims are governed by tort statutes of
limitations.

Finally, Petrus explains why summary judgment cannot be

affirmed on the alternative basis (suggested by the district court) of the
economic loss rule.

A.

The History of Implied Warranties.

The historical origins of the claim for breach of the implied warranties
does not control the present issue, but it is important background and helps
inform the question of whether the claim is more akin to one sounding in tort
or in contract.
As explained by Dean William L. Prosser, to whom this Court has
frequently looked for clarity in this area (see, e.g., Salmon Rivers, 97 Idaho at
311-12), "[t]he action for breach of warranty was originally on the case,
sounding in tort and closely allied to deceit ...." Prosser, The Assault on the
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Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960) ("Prosser").

Presser's deep analysis also confirms as "undisputed" the fact that "the
original tort form of action ... still survives to the present day, and may
everywhere be maintained." Id. According to Prosser, this is not a "mere
technical matter of procedure," as there are "many decisions which have held
that the tort aspects of warranty permit the application of a tort rather than a
contract rule, in such matters as the survival of actions, the statute of
limitation, the measure of damages, or recovery for wrongful death." Id.
(extensive citations omitted).
While warranties originally arose as a tort concept, Prosser explains
that the theory was later grafted into the law of contracts, almost as an
addendum to the express warranties that accompany the sale of many goods.
Id. at 1100. That, in tum, led to the recognition of implied warranties-first of
title, and later of quality and habitability-which provided the foundation for

Justice Cardoza's seminal decision in MacPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y. 382,
389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916), giving birth to the law of strict liability in
tort. As Prosser explains it, "the old tort character has continued to color the
substantive law of warranty itself," and "there are a great many cases ... in
which to say that the warranty is a term of the contract is 'to speak the
language of pure fiction."' Prosser, 69 Yale L.J. at 1127 (citation omitted).
Prosser explains the point further like this:
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[O]nce the contract action was established, it came
into such universal and almost exclusive use that, in
the minds of nearly all courts and lawyers, warranty,
whether express or implied, became definitely
identified with the contract, and regarded as an
integral and inseparable part of it. This attitude
persists to such an extent that the theory of warranty,
far from being an aid to the recognition of strict
liability to the consumer, has proved in many
jurisdictions to be an actual deterrent; and in all
probability this has considerably delayed any change
in the law. Id. at 1128.
Ultimately, Prosser observes that this hybrid concept of implied
warranties has caused special confusion with respect to the defenses that ought
to apply to any action upon those warranties.

Specifically he mentions

contributory negligence, but the same thoughts apply equally to the statute of
limitations defense at the center of this case.

Prosser asserts that "the

confusion is merely part of the general murk which surrounds 'warranty,' and
is another indication that that unhappy word is a source of trouble in this
connection," that it "appears probable that ordinary rules applicable to the tort
action will be carried over," and that "the assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace." Id. at 1147-48.
Prosser spoke to this issue almost 70 years ago. The revolution he
predicted has been slow, and has advanced at different speeds in different
jurisdictions; but it has been decided, with an ever-increasing number of
jurisdictions now permitting claims for breach of the implied warranties by
remote purchasers, even absent privity of contract. Consistent with that trend,
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this case now presents this Court with the perfect opportunity to revisit an
issue it last teased 30 years ago in Tusch, and to validate the compelling public
policies that favor holding builders accountable to remote but hapless
homeowners, for whom a poorly constructed home can mean financial ruin.
In the end, Petrus asks this Court to rule expressly that a claim for breach of
the implied warranty of habitability arises in tort, and is therefore governed by
the applicable statutes of limitations governing tort actions.

B.

Idaho Case Law Supports Petrus's Position.
1.

Tomita v. Johnson.

Case law relevant to the issue presented in this appeal traces back to at
least 1930 and the case of Tomita v. Johnson, 49 Idaho 643, 200 P. 395 (1930)
("Tomita"). In that case, an experienced tenant farmer purchased potato seeds

from his landlord, knowing they were partly spoiled and mostly diseased. A
poor crop resulted, and the tenants sued the seller, asserting a claim based on
allegedly defective seeds. The district court entered judgment for the seller,
and the tenant appealed.
This Court affirmed, finding that the tenant "was in no wise misled at
the time of planting," and ruling that "under these facts he cannot recover crop
damage resulting from planting the diseased seed in question." Tomita, 290 P.
at 396. The Court explained that "[t]he substantive law applicable [to this
case] is the law of warranty," that "there arises [in this situation] an implied
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warranty that the seed is suitable for the purposes intended," and (of greatest
importance here) that "the right of action in damages for breach of such
warranty accrues at the time it is ascertained by the purchaser that the seed is
not as represented." Id.
Precisely so, submits Petrus, just as his cause of action for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability should not have accrued until it was
ascertained by him, the subsequent purchaser, that the home was not fit for
habitation.
2.

Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft.

Forty-five years later, in Salmon Rivers, this Court confronted squarely
the anomalies inherent in implied warranties, this time in the context of a
products liability action. In that case, the remote buyer of a Cessna airplane
sued the manufacturer of the plane on an implied warranty theory to recover
damages for only economic loss (cost of repair and loss of use) allegedly
caused when the plane had mechanical failure and crashed. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of lack of
privity, the buyer appealed, and this Court ultimately affirmed.
The analysis began with the observation that "[t]he role of privity in
products liability actions remains an unsettled legal issue," and that the "action
varies in fortune depending upon the type of recovery sought, the legal basis
upon which the desired recovery is grounded, and the applicable statute of
limitations." Salmon Rivers, 544 P.2d at 309. That said, this Court made

19

clear that the only issue before it presently was "whether a plaintiff may
maintain an action against a manufacturer, with which it is not in privity of
contract, to recover economic loss on the ground of breach of implied
warranty within the contract statute of limitations [Idaho Code section 5217]." Id at 310.

To answer that question, the Court alluded again to "the dual character
of an action for breach of implied warranty as it has developed in American
jurisprudence," and quoted Prosser for his observation that "consideration of
an action grounded in breach of implied warranty can become complicated 'by
the peculiar and uncertain nature and character of warranty, a freak hybrid
born of the illicit intercourse of tort and contract."' Id. at 311 (citing Prosser,
69 Yale L.J. at 1124-36).

The Court cited further to Prosser for the

propositions that "O]udicial utilization of the contract concept of warranty
should not camouflage the fact that the courts employed the concept to permit
a recovery in tort," and that "a plaintiff generally may base an action for
breach of warranty on either tort or contract." Id. at 311 (quoting Prosser, 69
Yale L.J. at 1126-27).
Still, having noted the ambiguity, the Court then switched perspectives
and looked to "courts and commentators" (in particular back to Prosser) for
the conclusion that privity of contract "is required in a contract action to
recover economic loss for breach of implied warranty." Id. at 312. According
to the Court: "This conclusion primarily is founded upon a commercial nature
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of such an action and upon the legal principle that a contract, even including
its implied terms only arises from an agreement between two or more parties."
Id. That conclusion also found support in "previous decisions of this Court in

products liability actions to recover economic loss." Id. (citations omitted).
In the process, however-and of particular importance to understanding

the evolution of this issue and the essence of Petrus' s present appeal-the
Court quoted Prosser again for the proposition that, where there is no privity,
"liability to the consumer must be in tort and not in contract." Id. (emphasis
added). And, although the Court made clear that "this case is not appropriate
for deciding whether the statute of limitations . . . begins to run at the date of
sale or at the date of discovery of the defect," it recognized its own previous
ruling on that subject in Tomita, which, it said, "suggests a conclusion
contrary to that for which the respondents argue" (that is, that the statute
should not accrue until the particular defect is discovered).
3.

Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin: The Majority Opinion

A dozen years after it decided Salmon Rivers, the Court returned to this
implied warranty puzzle in Tusch, a case with facts that closely parallel
Petrus's case.
In Tusch, the plaintiff (Tusch) purchased several residential duplexes,
and later discovered they suffered from "major structural infirmities." Id. at
1023. Tusch sued the seller and the builder for negligence, misrepresentation,
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breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty, in each instance
claiming only economic loss in the form of lost rental income and property
damage. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims (id. at
1025); Tusch appealed; and this Court affirmed in part (as to the negligence
and express warranty claims), and reversed in part (as to the misrepresentation
and breach of implied warranty claims).
With respect to Tusch's breach of implied warranty claim, the Court
first considered the relevance of disclaimers and observed that "[b]ecause the
implied warranty of habitability is a creature of public policy, public policy
indicates that it be waived only with difficulty." Id. at 1031.

Since the

implied warranties were not adequately waived, the Court turned to Tusch's
implied warranty claim against the seller, and cited its decision in Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966), which confirmed that "when

builder-vendors sell newly constructed buildings there is an implied warranty
that the building will be habitable." Id. at 1032.
Most importantly for present purposes, the Court wrote at length about
its own rejection of the doctrine of caveat emptor-a contract concept-"as
applied to the sale of new houses."

Id.

Observing that its view was

"consistent with the vast weight of authority," the Court stated that the "trend
away from the doctrine of caveat emptor in transactions of this nature is
rooted in considerations of public policy." Quoting from a Wyoming case on
the subject, the Court commented as follows:
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The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary
home buyer is not in a position to discover hidden
defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to
place reliance on the builder or developer who sells
him a new home, the purchase of which in so many
instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes
in a lifetime. Courts will judicially protect the victims
of shoddy workmanship.
Consumer protection
demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely
on the skill of the builder and that the house is
constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended
use. The average purchaser is without adequate
knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful
inspection of the component parts of residential
structure. Id. at 1032 (quoting Moxley v. Laramie
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 735 (Wyo. 1979)).
The Court also looked to Richard Posner (the eminent University of
Chicago law and economics professor, now Judge on the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals) to make the point that "economic policy considerations
come into play as well." Id. Thus, the Court expressed agreement with the
propositions that builder-vendors have "superior knowledge, skill, and
experience in the construction of houses," are "generally better-positioned
than the purchaser to know whether a house is suitable for habitation," are
"better-positioned to evaluate and guard against the financial risk" posed by
latent defects, and are better able "to absorb and spread across the market of
home purchasers the loss therefrom."

Id. at 1033 (quoting R. Posner,

Economic Analysis of Law (2d ed. 1977)).
The Court then noted the "growing trend among other jurisdictions" to
"extend the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent purchasers." Id.
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Citing to consistent authority from Wyoming, New Jersey, Indiana, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Texas, the Court quoted at length from yet
another case, this one from the Arizona Supreme Court:
The same policy considerations that lead to [our
adoption of the implied warranty of habitability for
sales of new homes]-that house-building is
frequently undertaken on a large scale, that builders
hold themselves out as skilled in the profession, that
modem construction is complex and regulated by
many governmental codes, and that homebuyers are
generally not skilled or knowledgeable in construction,
plumbing, or electrical requirements and practicesare equally applicable to subsequent homebuyers.
Also, we note that the character of our society is such
that people and families are increasingly mobile.
Home builders should anticipate that the houses they
construct will eventually, and perhaps frequently,
change ownership. The effect of latent defects will be
just as catastrophic on a subsequent owner as on an
original buyer and the builder will be just as unable to
justify improper or substandard work.
Because the builder-vendor is in a better position than
a subsequent owner to prevent occurrence of major
problems, the cost of poor workmanship should be his
to bear. Id. at 1034 (quoting Richards v. Powercrafi
Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 678 P.2d 427 (1984))
(paragraphing added).
Based on that logic, the Court "adopted the reasoning of these courts,"
with the single proviso that this "extension of liability" is "limited to latent
defects, not discoverable by a subsequent purchaser's responsible inspection,
manifesting themselves after the purchase." Id. at 1035 (quoting Barnes v.

Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 277, 342 N.E.2d 619 (1976)). And thus, the
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Court held, "subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings, who suffer purely
economic losses from latent defects . . . may maintain an action against the
builder . . . of the dwelling based upon the implied warranty of habitability
despite the fact that no privity of contract exists between the two." Id. at
1035-36.
The Court concluded that any other holding would "lead to an absurd
result," explaining as follows:
For example, suppose an unscrupulous builder
constructed a home of inferior quality and sold it to
another. Suppose further, that for whatever reason, the
buyer after three months sold the home to a second
purchaser. And one month later the foundation of the
house split apart rendering the home valueless. Should
the common law deny the subsequent purchaser a
remedy against the builder merely because there is no
privity of contract and because the damages happen to
be purely economic, when it was the conduct of the
builder which created the latent defect in the first
place? Id. at 1036.
With that, the Court held it was error to grant summary judgment in
favor of the builder on Tusch's implied warranty of merchantability claim and
remanded the case for further proceedings, exactly as Petrus is asking the
Court to do in his case.
4.

Tusch: The Additional Opinions on Point.

In addition to the majority opinion in Tusch (by Justice Donaldson),
Justice Bistline, for himself and Justice Huntley, wrote a separate concurring
opinion to note that Salmon Rivers had actually been overruled previously in
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State v. Mitchell Construction Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984). But

putting aside the "anomalies" Justice Bistline alluded to regarding the
reporting of the Mitchell case, the important point here is that, even before
Tusch, this Court was already moving in the direction of providing more

protection for consumers who suffer economic loss like those incurred by
Petrus.
Justice Bakes also wrote a separate opinion in Tusch, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, calling it a "sheer contradiction" for the Court "to hold
that a subsequent buyer has a cause of action against a builder 'upon the
implied warranty of habitability' and then state that no privity of contract need
exist between the two." Id. at 52. In the view of Justice Bakes, "the Court's
action today is not based upon the well established and understood cause of
action in contract for breach of implied warranty, but has created a new cause
of action in tort." Id. And that, Justice Bakes warned, "will result in a great
deal of uncertainty" because:
The Court's opinion does not define what is required
to establish a prima facie case under its new cause of
action, or what the applicable burden of proof should
be. The opinion is silent as to whether tort or contract
statutes of limitations will apply in fact suggesting that
may be neither would be applicable, but that some
other "reasonable time" period might be. A limitations
period which commences only upon the appearance of
"latent defenses manifesting themselves within a
reasonable time" will prove to be the most elusive part
of the Court's opinion today. Id.
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Justice Shepherd also wrote a dissenting opinion in Tusch, rebuking the
Court for "continu[ing] its recent trend in creating new causes of action where
none had previously existed," and stating he would "decline to extend the
doctrine of implied warranty of habitability to the circumstances of the instant
case." Id. at 54.
In sum, it has been 30 years since this Court broke new ground and
definitively ruled-based primarily on reasons of public policy-that a remote
purchaser of a home can maintain a cause of action against the builder based
on the implied warranty of habitability, even without privity of contract. This
case now presents the Court with the opportunity to make express what logic
and the law both compel, that this "new" cause of action is one that arises in
tort, and one that must, therefore, be governed by tort statutes of limitations.1
5.

Post-Tusch Case Law Confirms Its Central Ruling.

Since deciding Tusch in 1987, this Court has returned periodically to
the unique issues raised by implied warranty claims (particularly whether they
arise in tort or contract, and whether they are governed by the economic loss

In this respect, the Court is referred to Bishop v. Owens 152
Idaho 616, 272 P.3d 1247 (2012), which includes an informative
discussion concerning the hybrid character of a claim for professional
malpractice, depending on the context of the exact claim asserted. Of
particular interest here, note that the Court observed that "professional
malpractice actions traditionally have been characterized as tort actions in
the context of the statute of limitations."
2
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rule.

See, e.g., Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 983 P.2d 848 (1999)

("Ramerth"); Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Donnelly, 154 Idaho
499, 300 P.3d 31 (2013) ("Employers MutuaI"); American West Enterprises,
Inc. v. CNH, LLC, 155 Idaho 746, 316 P.3d 662 (2013) ("American West").
The upshot of those cases is that the Court has not overruled the general
rule established by Salmon River, and that privity of contract is still required

in most implied warranty contexts (dealing with ordinary product defects,
commercial transactions, and "services" cases). But the cases also all show
fidelity to the holding in Tusch, and acknowledge implicitly that the same
rules do not apply the context of homeowners and the implied warranty of
habitability. For instance, in Ramerth, the Court validated the Salmon Rivers
holding; but it also cited favorably to Tusch, recognized that Tusch was "not a
goods case," and expressly acknowledged that "there may be cases where the
plaintiff may be unfairly prejudiced by the operation of the economic loss rule
in combination with the privity requirement articulated in Salmon Rivers.
Given such a case, further relaxation of Salmon Rivers may be justified." Id.
at 198.
In Employers Mutual, the Court confronted whether damages awarded
by a jury on a breach of the implied warranty of workmanship claim arising
out of a construction contract were more in the nature of contract damages or
tort damages (important for insurance purposes). The Court stated that the
"key determination" is whether the duty is based upon a contractual promise
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or if the duty can be maintained without the contract. Employers Mutual, 154
Idaho at 505.

The Court observed that the jury found that the breach

"occurred with regard to [the contractor's] performance under the remodeling
contract," and noted that that there was "no duty beyond the contractual
promise between [the contractor and the plaintiff]." Accordingly the court
found the damages to be contract damages (and hence not covered by the
insurance policy at issue). Here, Petrus's case-for breach of the implied
warranty of habitability-did not arise by contract.
In American West, the Court revisited this string of cases (including
Salmon Rivers, Tusch, and Ramerth) in the context of an ordinary commercial

case to recover the cost of a tractor engine. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's claim based on the implied warranty of merchantability because
there was no privity between the buyer and the defendant, and this Court
affirmed on that claim. In the process, the Court reprised again its own ruling
in Salmon Rivers, noted that that case "narrowly considered the type of action
involved [a products case]," and "limited its ruling" to cases involving "an
action against a manufacturer." However, the Court alluded again to the
"complicated nature of warranty cases as a hybrid creature of contract and
tort," and noted that the outcome in Salmon Rivers "was based primarily on
the commercial nature of the action and on the principle that the implied terms
of a warranty can only arise from an agreement between two or more parties."
Id. at 750. The Court also noted expressly that "privity of contract is required
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in a contract action to recover economic loss for breach of implied warranty,
potentially unless the application of this rule would have the effect of unfairly
prejudicing the plaintiff." Id.
Petrus' s points here are simple. Privity of contract may still be required
to recover economic loss in most breach of implied warranty cases; but the
implied warranty of habitability is unique, and exists between a buyer and
even a remote seller as a matter of law, apart from contract, as a matter of
compelling public policies. In sum, this is "that case"-anticipated more than
40 years ago in Salmon Rivers, but alluded to again as recently as 2013 in
American West-where a plaintiff has been "unfairly prejudiced by the

operation of the economic loss rule in combination with the privity
requirement," or where "application of [the privity rule] would have the effect
of unfairly prejudicing the plaintiff." This, then, is the case where this Court
should revisit this important area of law, and should rule expressly not just
that a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability arises in tort,
but that it logically then is governed by tort statutes of limitations.

C.

Persuasive Authority from Other Jurisdictions Supports Petrus.

In each of the cases discussed above, this Court has considered
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to inform its own analysis in this
evolving area of the law. In that spirit, Petrus examines several cases from
other jurisdictions that have ruled-consistent with his theory of this case-
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not only that the implied warranty of habitability is a tort, but also that it is
governed by tort statutes of limitations.
For instance, in Richman v. Watel, 565 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1978),
plaintiff sued the builder of a new home for breach of the implied warranty o
habitability when the floor in the front part of his home collapsed. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the builder on the basis of the
four-year contract statute of limitations; but a Texas Court of Civil Appeals
reversed, ruling that: "The breach of the implied warranty of fitness arising
from the construction and sale of a new house is considered to be a tort rather
than a contract concept," and ruling further that the limitation "commences on
the breach of implied warranty when the buyer discovers or should discover
the injury." Id. at 102 (citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (1968)). In
language that should apply equally to the dry rot and water intrusion that
damaged Petrus's home, the Court explained:
The failure of defendant to properly vent the
foundation did not give rise to a cause of action at the
time, thus plaintiffs' cause of action accrues and the
statute of limitations begins to run when damages are
sustained, here when the floor collapsed. Id. at 103.
In Texas, the law in this area is settled beyond dispute. For example, in

Gibson v. John D. Campbell and Co., 624 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App. 1981), an
owner brought an action against a builder for breach of the implied warranty
of habitability, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
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builder, and the owner appealed.

The issue on appeal was whether the

evidence was sufficient to resolve when the owner should have realized the
alleged defect, but the Court began its opinion by observing: "Both parties
agree that the statute of limitations governing breach of implied warranty of
habitability begins to run when the buyer discovers or would have discovered
the injury." Id. at 731 (citing Richman, 565 S.W.2d at 102).
Similarly, in Swaw v. Ortell, 137 Ill.App.3d 60,484 N.E.2d 780 (1984),
the buyers of a house sued the builder, alleging the house was not habitable.
The trial court dismissed the buyer's second amended complaint, but the
appellate court reversed in part. With respect to the buyer's claim for breach
of the implied warranty of habitability, the Court ruled:
The applicable statute of limitations is the 5 years
provided in section 15 of the Limitations Act for
actions to recover damages for an injury done to
property, real or personal. The accrual of a cause of
action starts the limitations clock. Under the discovery
rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a person
knows or reasonably should know of his injury and
also knows or reasonably should know that it was
wrongfully caused. The discovery rule applies to
actions against contractors for failure to construct or
design a building properly. Id. at 70 (citations
omitted).
In sum, Petrus knows that Idaho is sovereign, that authority from outof-state does not control, and that Idaho law must evolve at its own speed and
in its own direction. Still, Petrus suggests that the logic of the four cases
discussed above is compelling, and strongly supports his argument here. That
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is, the claim for breach of implied warranty, at least as to a remote purchaser,
cannot possibly be a contract claim because there is no privity between the
buyer and the seller. Rather, the claim exists in the first place because it
serves larger public policy goals, and it is, in that respect, a tort. And a tort,
Petrus submits, must logically be governed by the statutes of limitations that
govern torts.

D.

The Economic Loss Rule Does Not Support Summary Judgment.

Kirk's motion for summary judgment was based primarily on the
statute of limitations argument discussed above. R. Vol. 1, pp. 551-53. As
explained, the district court agreed, ruling that "Petrus' s claim is subject to
section 5-241(b)'s completion-of-construction accrual and to section 5-217's
four-year [contract] limitations period." R. Vol. 1, p. 979. However, the
district court added a single-sentence, sua-sponte footnote after that, stating:
"If that claim sounded in tort, it seemingly would be analogous to a claim for

negligent construction," and "would be barred by the 'economic loss rule' in
any event." R. Vol. 1, p. 979. See also R. Vol. 1, pp. 1073-74 (where the
district court reiterated that conclusion in denying Petrus's motion for
reconsideration). That off-hand statement, however, cannot possibly justify
affirming the summary judgment in favor of Kirk at this stage of the
proceedings.
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First, the district court's comments conflict directly with Tusch, which
held specifically that "subsequent purchasers of residential dwellings, who
suffer purely economic losses from latent defects manifesting themselves
within a reasonable time, may maintain an action against the builder ... of the
dwelling based upon the implied warranty of habitability despite the fact that
no privity of contract exists between the two." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 50-51.
The Tusch Court explained that conclusion with this rhetorical question
(quoted previously, at p. 22): "Should the common law deny the subsequent
purchaser a remedy against the builder merely because there is no privity of
contract and because the damages happen to be purely economic, when it was
the conduct of the builder which created the latent defect in the first place?"
Id. at 51. The answer was no there, and it should be no here.
Even if Tusch were not so clear, Kirk never raised the economic loss
rule in his motion for summary judgment below, and neither the facts nor the
law on this theory were developed sufficiently to permit the district court to
rule upon it.

Specifically, there was no evidence before the trial court

confirming exactly what the nature or scope of Petrus' s damages were. And,
as Petrus explained in his motion seeking reconsideration, the economic loss
rule is not absolute in any event.
For instance, case law recognizes that the economic loss rule does not
apply where there is a "special relationship" between the parties. Blahd v.
Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300, 108 P.3d 996, 1000 (2005)
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("Blahd'). As explained in Blahd, that term "refers to those situations where

the relationship ... is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty ..
. ." Id. at 301. And, while that exception has been interpreted narrowly in the

past, it should be now deemed to apply here, particularly in light of Tusch
(which was based entirely on the equities, and which found the duties inherent
in the implied warranties to run from a home builder directly to a subsequent
purchaser). The exception precisely fits the pattern of the case law identified
in Blahd, given that builders (like Kirk) are "professionals or quasiprofessionals," and "hold themselves out to the public as having expertise
regarding a specialized function." Id.
The Court in Blahd also recognized an exception for "unique
circumstances requiring a different allocation of risk." Id. at 302 (citing Just's
Inc. v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 470, 583 P.2d 997, 1005

(1978)). And in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho
22, 28, 244 P.3d 166, 172 (2010), the Court identified an exception for torts
arising where economic loss exists but is parasitic to property damage or
personal injury (issues that Petrus never had the opportunity to present facts
on or to brief in the district court, given that Kirk's motion did not raise this
issue at all).
Ultimately, in this appeal, Petrus asks the Court to reexamine a large
body of case law dealing with the devastating issues confronting buyers who
conduct responsible home inspections, but later face financial ruin due to the
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negligent conduct of mass builders who cut comers and construct homes with
latent defects, certain to manifest down the road. That, Petrus submits, creates
a "special relationship," and illustrates the sort of "unique circumstances
requiring a different allocation of risk" that should render the economic loss
rule inapplicable here. In the end, it would be utterly inconsistent for Tusch to
expressly permit a remote homeowner to maintain a claim for breach of the
implied warranty of habitability-necessarily in tort, because there is not
privity with the builder-but then to dismiss the claim because the buyer has
only economic loss.

E.

Public Policy Supports Petrus's Right to Recover.

Decades before it decided Tusch, this Court recognized the particular
public policies that come to bear in the context of home buyers and home
builders.

For instance, in Bethlahmy, the Court recognized the "trend in

judicial opinions to invoke the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness in cases
involving sales of new houses by the builder." Id. at 67. According to the
Court:
The old rule of caveat emptor does not satisfy the
demands of justice in such cases. The purchase of a
home is not an everyday transaction for the average
family, and in many instances the most important
transaction of a lifetime. To apply the rule of caveat
emptor to an inexperienced buyer and in favor of a
builder who is daily engaged in the business of
building and selling houses, is manifestly a denial of
justice.
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In Tusch, the Court referred favorably to Bethlahmy, and quoted
extensively from Moxley, 600 P.2d at 735, to make these points:
The mores of the day have changed and the ordinary
home buyer is not in a position to discover hidden
defects in a structure. A home buyer should be able to
place reliance on the builder or developer who sells
him a new home, the purchase of which in so many
instances, is the largest single purchase a family makes
in a lifetime. Courts will judicially protect the victims
of shoddy workmanship.
Consumer protection
demands that those who buy homes are entitled to rely
on the skill of the builder and that the house is
constructed so as to be reasonably fit for its intended
use. The average purchaser is without adequate
knowledge or opportunity to make a meaningful
inspection of the component parts of a residential
structure. Id. at 735, footnote omitted.
The opinion in Tusch also noted that, in this context, "economic policy
considerations come into play as well." Tusch, 113 Idaho at 47-48. Looking
again to Prosser, the Court considered that home builders have "superior
knowledge, skill, and experience in the construction of houses," that they are
"generally better positioned than the purchaser to know whether a house is
suitable for habitation," and that they are "better positioned to evaluate and
guard against the financial risk posed by [latent defects], and to absorb and
spread across the market of home purchasers the loss therefrom." Id. at 48.
In the end, this case illustrates perfectly the concern raised by this
Court in Tusch when it posed the rhetorical question of whether the common
law should deny the subsequent purchaser (here, Petrus) a remedy against the
builder (Kirk) "merely because there is no privity of contract and because the
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damages happen to be purely economic, when it was the conduct of the
builder which created the latent defect in the first place." Tusch, 113 Idaho at
51.

The answer is, it should not.

Home builders owe purchasers and

subsequent purchasers an implied duty that the homes they build are habitable.
Public policy then demands that any claim for breach of that duty cannot
possibly begin to run until the breach manifests itself and is either known or
should reasonably be known to the home buyer.
Here, the effect of the district court's ruling is that the statute of
limitations on Petrus' s claim against Kirk had already expired before Petrus
even bought the house. That makes no sense at all, and the result does not
serve the indicated public policies of protecting homeowners and holding
builders accountable.

The district court's ruling on summary judgment does

not withstand scrutiny, and cannot be allowed to stand.

VIII.
CONCLUSION

Petrus, of course, had no contract with Kirk; he was not in privity with
Kirk; and his action against Kirk should not be misconstrued to be based on
contract. It is not. It is based on a warranty, implied by law, and enforced by
courts as a matter of public policy. It is intellectually inaccurate, then, to treat
the claim as one arising in contract, or to restrict it by any defenses-statutes
of limitations included-intended to apply to contract actions.
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For those and all the reasons stated, above, Petrus respectfully submits
that the district court erred as a matter of law in ruling that his claim for
breach of the implied warranty of habitability was governed by the statute that
controls actions on a contract, rather than those that control actions on a tort.
The ruling of the district court should be reversed, and the matter remanded
for further proceedings on the merits.
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